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Abstract
In this article, we address an apparent paradox in the literature on mental time travel and mind-wandering: How is it pos-
sible that future thinking is both constructive, yet often experienced as occurring spontaneously? We identify and describe 
two ‘routes’ whereby episodic future thoughts are brought to consciousness, with each of the ‘routes’ being associated with 
separable cognitive processes and functions. Voluntary future thinking relies on controlled, deliberate and slow cognitive 
processing. The other, termed involuntary or spontaneous future thinking, relies on automatic processes that allows ‘fully-
fledged’ episodic future thoughts to freely come to mind, often triggered by internal or external cues. To unravel the paradox, 
we propose that the majority of spontaneous future thoughts are ‘pre-made’ (i.e., each spontaneous future thought is a re-
iteration of a previously constructed future event), and therefore based on simple, well-understood, memory processes. We 
also propose that the pre-made hypothesis explains why spontaneous future thoughts occur rapidly, are similar to involuntary 
memories, and predominantly about upcoming tasks and goals. We also raise the possibility that spontaneous future think-
ing is the default mode of imagining the future. This dual process approach complements and extends standard theoretical 
approaches that emphasise constructive simulation, and outlines novel opportunities for researchers examining voluntary 
and spontaneous forms of future thinking.
Episodic future thinking is the ability to imagine or simulate 
events that may or may not occur in the future (Atance & 
O’Neill, 2001). It allows humans to engage in complex acts 
of future-oriented behaviour (Tulving, 2005), and has now 
garnered substantial interest from researchers of cognition, 
neuropsychology, and neuroscience (for a recent review, 
see Schacter, Benoit & Szpunar, 2017). In this paper, we 
focus on, and address, a central assumption of research on 
future thinking that has dominated the field over the past 
decade, namely that future thinking is a constructive and 
effortful process (see Schacter, 2012; Buckner & Carroll, 
2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Suddendorf & Corbal-
lis, 2007; Wheeler, Stuss & Tulving, 1997). Despite this 
focus on constructive processes, recent findings from related 
fields of involuntary mental time travel and mind wander-
ing have provided undeniable evidence that future thoughts 
can be experienced with the same phenomenological ‘rich-
ness’ as those elicited constructively, but without effort and 
conscious intent. Here, we refer to such mental experiences 
as involuntary or spontaneous future thoughts (Bernsten, 
2019; Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019, for definitions), and pose 
the following question: If future thinking is predominantly 
constructive, how is it possible it is often experienced as 
occurring spontaneously?
In this position paper, we put forward a dual process 
account of future thinking. Within this account, we question 
the view that episodic future thought typically involves more 
executive processes than remembering (see Schacter, Addis, 
Hassabis, Martin, Spreng, & Szpunar, 2012 for a review). 
Instead, we propose that episodic future thinking can occur 
via two ‘routes’ which are associated with separable cog-
nitive processes: (a) a slow, voluntary route that involves 
wilfully constructing and elaborating a scenario and (b) a 
rapid, spontaneous route that often involves reincarnating 
a ‘pre-made’ future scenario. It is proposed that voluntary 
and spontaneous future thinking are related in a sequential 
fashion—(a) → (b)—such that the majority of spontaneous 
future thoughts can be traced back to their original con-
structed ‘event’ (e.g., (a)1 → (b)1; (a)2 → (b)2; (a)3 → (b)3…). 
We believe this approach is the most parsimonious way of 
interpreting findings from research on voluntary future 
thinking, involuntary future thinking, prospective memory 
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and mind wandering, and reflects more accurately how 
humans imagine the future in everyday life (cf. Kvavilash-
vili & Rummel, 2019).
The standard approach to episodic future 
thinking
The modus operandi of laboratory-based psychological 
research, especially in cognitive psychology, has been to 
present participants with stimuli (which can be manipulated 
as independent variables) and ask for responses (represent-
ing the dependent variable/s). Research on future thinking 
has largely followed this template: almost all future think-
ing studies have used standardised instructions which spec-
ify the type of event that participants must simulate (e.g., 
a future event related to a cue-word ‘park’/‘5 years in the 
future’; see Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2008; Cole, Morrison 
& Conway, 2013; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004), 
and researchers measure responses via subjective rating 
scales (e.g., vividness, see D’Argembeau & Van der Lin-
den, 2004) or by coding the verbal output (episodic detail, 
see Addis et al., 2008). This paradigm for studying future 
thinking has relied heavily on the cue word method used in 
the study of autobiographical memory where participants are 
asked to interrogate their autobiographical memory knowl-
edge base to recall a specific event in response to a given cue 
word (Crovitz & Shiffman, 1974; see Conway, 2005; Con-
way, Justice & D’Argembeau, 2018, for reviews). However, 
a unique configuration of task instructions is employed in 
studies of future thinking by requesting that imagined future 
events are specific and “plausible, given the participant’s 
plans, and novel, that is, not previously experienced by the 
participant” (p. 35, Addis et al., 2008; see also Cole et al., 
2013; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004).
In our view, the fact that episodic future thinking has been 
investigated using paradigms that favour deliberate construc-
tive processes, and that have a series of ‘rules’ not present 
in studies of autobiographical remembering, naturally con-
tributes to the evidence from cognitive neuroscience (e.g., 
Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003) and 
neuropsychology (deVito, Gamboz, Brandimonte, Barone, 
Amboni & Della Sala, 2012) that future thinking, in gen-
eral, is associated with cognitive control processes, and that 
these are greater than those required in autobiographical 
remembering. For example, the well-established construc-
tive episodic simulation hypothesis delineates how both 
episodic memory and future thinking use the same re/con-
structive processes, but also how episodic future thoughts 
can be simulated by additional extraction and integration 
of autobiographical details (i.e., people, places and objects) 
from long term memory to arrive at a novel representation 
of a future event (Schacter & Addis, 2007). Undoubtedly, 
implementation of standardised instructions across studies 
has led to a set of convergent and reliable findings and prin-
ciples, which has been widely beneficial to the field, lead-
ing to its popularity and many breakthroughs (see Klein, 
2013; Schacter et al., 2012 for reviews). However, the use 
of certain paradigms which are ideally designed and suited 
to elicit deliberate constructive processes (what we term 
‘the standard approach’) can give rise to the idea that future 
thinking is by its nature, a constructive process (e.g., Hassa-
bis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Suddendorf 
& Corballis, 2007).
Other influential theoretical approaches to future think-
ing have similarly elaborated on the controlled processes 
involved in constructing a future scenario, and were largely 
based on evidence from event construction studies (Buckner 
& Carroll,2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007). Within these theories, the central ques-
tion primarily concerned the best ways of measuring and 
explaining constructive processes in future thinking, without 
considering the possible role/s of spontaneous cognition in 
future thinking.
These approaches may have been influenced, in part, by 
traditional approaches to voluntary memory retrieval, the 
‘flip-side’ of episodic future thinking (Schacter & Addis, 
2007), which invoked controlled recollection or strategic 
retrieval as its core process to mentally revisit the past (see 
Conway, 2005; Tulving, 2002 for reviews). Controlled recol-
lection is thought to involve iterative sequences of memory 
searches (typically from self-concept information through 
general lifetime information to more specific event-based 
information), in which a specific event is eventually con-
structed based on the goals of the specific search (Conway, 
2005). An analogous process is thought to occur in episodic 
future thinking (Conway, Justice & D’Argembeau, 2019 (for 
more details see the section below on ‘Related theoretical 
models’ and Fig. 1 for a representation of this model).
Furthermore, in Conway et al.’s, updated autobiographi-
cal memory system, there are two parallel and hierarchically 
organised autobiographical knowledge structures, referring 
to ones’ past and one’s future, respectively, which can both 
vary in terms of specificity of mental representations at dif-
ferent levels of the hierarchy (Conway et al., 2019). Here, 
we describe the various ‘levels’ of future-based knowledge 
specified within this model, which interact to enable humans 
to imagine specific episodic future events (Atance & O’Neill, 
2001; Szpunar, 2010). The most abstract is the conceptual 
self which represents knowledge of future self-images, such 
as ‘I will be a mother’ or ‘I will be a professor’ (Rathbone, 
Conway & Moulin, 2011). Of intermediate specificity is the 
level corresponding to one’s life story (McAdams, 2001) 
and lifetime periods in which future periods are represented, 
such as ‘When I have a family’ or ‘when I am retired’ (see 
Thomsen, 2015). More precisely constrained are general 
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events, representing event structures or scripts common to 
that lifetime period, for example ‘Taking my child to school 
in the mornings’ or ‘playing golf on Sundays’ (Anderson 
& Dewhurst, 2009). Most specific are episodic representa-
tions, or episodic future thoughts, which uniquely enable 
one to form mental representations using episodic-specific 
knowledge, such as people, setting and objects (Addis et al., 
2008; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). Importantly, 
abstract levels constrain the content at more specific lev-
els, thus, abstract autobiographical knowledge has a role in 
determining the content of episodic future thoughts (Conway 
et al., 2019), as can be observed when the iterative process 
of event construction is inspected via the use of think aloud 
tasks (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011).
However, these theories do not explicitly offer an account 
of the role of spontaneous processes in future thinking (but 
see Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2016). What of future 
thoughts that arise in consciousness ‘out of the blue’ (i.e., 
unintended) and do not appear to require constructive 
processes?
Unresolved questions in the standard 
approach
Our view is that there is now a substantial body of evidence 
that questions the generality of the standard approach to 
episodic future thinking and suggests that, in everyday life, 
future thoughts occur via two related, but largely independ-
ent, cognitive processes. We outline key pieces of evidence 
below.
Firstly, it is not always found that episodic future think-
ing is more effortful than episodic remembering. In several 
studies, when explicitly testing this idea, a clear difference 
between executive processing in past and future thinking 
was not evidenced (Anderson, Dewhurst & Nash, 2012; Cole 
et al., 2013; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2018) and latency to 
generate an event—often a proxy measure of effort—has 
failed to distinguish past and future events in landmark stud-
ies in the field (Addis et al., 2007; D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004). These facts imply that, even with the task 
constraints mentioned, greater executive resources are not 
always recruited when imagining the future versus remem-
bering the past.
Secondly, recent studies on autobiographical memory 
have found that traditional cue-word paradigms actually 
involve high proportions of spontaneously activated or 
directly retrieved memories (e.g., Harris, O’Connor & Sut-
ton, 2015; Uzer & Brown, 2017; Uzer, Lee & Brown, 2012). 
This finding questions the basic assumptions of the promi-
nent autobiographical memory model, which considers auto-
biographical memories as being predominantly constructed 
by top-down activation processes within the hierarchical 
autobiographical memory system (see Conway, 2005; Con-
way & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In a landmark replication of 
these studies with future imagined events, using the cue-
word paradigm, Jeunehomme and D’Argembeau (2016) 
found that around 60% of future thoughts were reported by 
participants as being ‘directly accessed’ rather than effort-
fully constructed. Directly accessed thoughts were defined 
as future thoughts that came to mind rapidly and effortlessly 
under standard cue-word paradigm conditions.1 Across three 
experiments, such thoughts were indeed accessed more 
rapidly (with median response times varying between 3.0 
and 4.4 s) than those classed by participants as generative 
thoughts (with median response times varying between 7.5 
and 17.1 s), showing that they were associated with less 
Fig. 1  Knowledge structure representing autobiographical memory 
and future thought in the revised Self memory system (Conway et al. 
2019) (Image taken from Conway et al. (2019). With permission from 
Martin Conway)
1 Directly accessed future thoughts are similar in many respects 
to our definition of spontaneous future thinking. They arise swiftly 
and with minimal or no effort. However, they are differentiated from 
spontaneous future thoughts by arising in the context of being in the 
voluntary imagining mode, similar to being in the retrieval mode dur-
ing standard autobiographical memory studies (e.g., see Barzykowsky 
& Staugaard, 2016).
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effort. The existence of such a large percentage of subjec-
tively ‘spontaneous’, directly-accessed thoughts in the con-
text of a paradigm designed to elicit constructive processes 
is somewhat surprising and difficult to explain (cf. Jeune-
homme & D’Argembeau, 2016).
In fact, this finding alone implies that other methods 
used to elicit voluntary future thoughts, may also involve 
spontaneous processes. For instance, it is possible that 
speeded tasks such as the future fluency tasks (MacLeod 
& Byrne, 1996), and sentence completion tasks (Ander-
son & Dewhurst, 2009) may involve a type of spontaneous 
chaining process (see Mace, 2009, for evidence of chain-
ing in memory). Future studies will be needed to validate 
these claims. Nevertheless, just as has happened in memory 
research (Hintzman, 2011), future thinking researchers are 
now asked to question the assumption that voluntary pro-
cesses are the norm.
Thirdly, the new area of spontaneous future cognition has 
emerged in recent years, defined as “unintended thought, 
related to the future, that comes to mind with little effort 
and little control over its content” (p. 635, Cole & Kvavilas-
hvili, 2019). This field has established that spontaneous 
future thinking is commonly experienced in the laboratory 
and daily life, and is subjectively experienced with similar 
vividness and feelings of mental time travel as voluntary 
future thinking (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Cole, Staugaard 
& Berntsen, 2016). We note two important findings: (1) a 
large proportion of mind wandering experiences elicited in 
the laboratory (Baird, Smallwood & Schooler, 2011; Small-
wood, Nind & O’Conner, 2009; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
Van der Linden & D’Argembeau, 2011; Stawarczyk, Cassol 
& D’Argembeau, 2013) and daily life (Andrews-Hanna, Kai-
ser, Turner, Reineberg, Godinez et al., 2013; Song & Wang, 
2012) are focussed on the future, rather than the present, or 
past (see Stawarczyk, 2018, for a review); (2) experiences 
of spontaneous future mental time travel in daily life and 
the laboratory are as common as involuntary memories, and 
are similar on several dimensions: they are often triggered 
by external cues, regularly refer to distinctive episodes and 
come to mind more rapidly than constructed events (see 
Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Cole et al., 2016). The key point 
is that there is now converging evidence from both mind 
wandering and mental time travel research that spontaneous 
future thinking is common, perhaps more so than voluntary 
future thinking (e.g., Plimpton, Patel & Kvavilashvili, 2015; 
Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016; Seli, Maillet, Smilek, Oak-
man & Schacter, 2017; Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Warden, 
Plimpton & Kvavilashvili, 2019). The potential importance 
of this area is reflected in the rapid expansion of directly rel-
evant studies examining its cognitive underpinnings, devel-
opmental trajectory and individual differences (see a special 
issue on Spontaneous Future Cognition in Psychological 
Research, 2019). Thus, a question emerges: If spontaneous 
future thinking is such a common aspect of daily life, why 
have experimental paradigms been used that restrict or pre-
vent examination of this important type of future cognition?
A dual process account of future thinking
In the present account of future thinking, we propose that in 
certain laboratory conditions (e.g., when completing monot-
onous and undemanding ongoing tasks) and especially in 
everyday contexts, future thinking can arise in an automatic 
way. This dual-process account complements and extends 
the currently dominant constructive process account and, 
we believe, provides more accurate fit for the diverse set of 
available data. For clarity, we do not imply that previous 
research on voluntary future thinking has been erroneous, 
or non-relevant. On the contrary, our dual process approach 
harnesses and adopts many insights from voluntary future 
thinking. However, here we aim to highlight and add the 
role of spontaneous cognitive processes to the investigation 
of future thinking by discussing its possible mechanisms, 
characteristics and functions.
At the outset, we need to clarify the terminology used 
to denote constructive and effortful processes in voluntary 
future thinking on the one hand, and the unintended nature of 
spontaneous future thoughts, on the other. This should also 
help to contextualise spontaneous future thinking, before 
we highlight its features below. One conceptual approach 
adopted in several studies using the descriptive experience 
sampling method (Hurlburt, 2011), assumes that rather than 
being distinct in kind, spontaneous future thoughts differ 
from ‘voluntary thoughts’ only by degree (i.e., they are 
characterised by less intention and less effort). Therefore, 
participants in these studies are asked to rate the intention-
ality of thoughts not as a dichotomy, but on a scale where 
only the end points correspond to the options ‘spontaneous’ 
and ‘deliberate’ (e.g., Martinon et al., 2019). However, in 
our view, this does not capture the qualities of spontane-
ous future thoughts, which become apparent when subtypes 
of future thinking are examined within a table, depicting 
types of future thinking in terms of intention and effort (see 
Table 1). While levels of effort involved in deliberately con-
structing a future scenario can vary along a continuum, the 
intention to construct such a scenario is either present or 
absent because one cannot intend to construct a future event 
only slightly or strongly. In other words, one is either in the 
‘construction mode’ (similar to ‘retrieval mode’ used in the 
literature on episodic memory) or not. In line with this argu-
ment, several studies have used a dichotomous approach, 
where participants are asked to report if a thought was spon-
taneous or intentional (Barzykowski, Radel, Niedźwieńska 
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& Kvavilashvili, 2019; Plimpton et al., 2015; Seli et al., 
2017; Vannucci, Pelagatti, Chiorri & Brugger, 2019).2
Within this context, spontaneous or involuntary future 
thoughts are clearly distinguishable from other subtypes of 
voluntary future thoughts elicited directly or generatively 
within the word-cue paradigm, by having no intention to 
imagine or construct a future thought, which phenomeno-
logically translates into future thoughts popping into one’s 
mind unexpectedly and without effort (see Barzykowski & 
Staugaard, 2016, for a similar conceptualisation of involun-
tary autobiographical memory).3 This conceptual structure 
is also useful in highlighting the absence of future thoughts, 
which would fall into a cell designated by “?” in Table 1 
(a perhaps implausible case where thinking about a future 
event is effortful but is not intended to take place).
In summary, this two-dimension structure appears help-
ful as it places known subtypes of future thinking into one 
of three cells and is contrary to the view that spontaneous 
future thoughts only differ from other subtypes by degree. 
Nevertheless, given that both spontaneously occurring 
and directly experienced voluntary future thoughts are 
characterised by a lack of (or minimal) effort and stra-
tegic construction processes, investigating similarities 
and differences between these two forms of future think-
ing is clearly an important avenue for future research 
(for similar research on involuntary and directly recalled 
autobiographical memories see Barzykowski & Staugaard, 
2016; Barzykowskyi, Niedźwieńska & Mazzoni, 2019).
The guiding assumption of our dual-process view is that 
vivid episodic future thoughts can be elicited via two routes: 
via either a controlled or spontaneous fashion, and that the 
mode of elicitation is influenced by the characteristics and 
requirements of the situation (see Table 2). These situations/
contexts are now quite widely documented, from laboratory 
studies that either instruct participants to wilfully generate 
future scenarios, or allow thoughts to flow freely (see Cole 
et al., 2016; Plimpton et al., 2015). To substantiate the claim 
that spontaneous future thinking is a genuine and substan-
tial component of future thinking, we provide summaries 
of the cognitive mechanisms, characteristics and functions 
of spontaneous and voluntary future thinking (see Table 2, 
for a summary). We do not aim to summarise all relevant 
research, rather, we use exemplar studies from each domain 
to illustrate dual processes of future thinking.
Voluntary future thinking
The deliberative, slow and self-directed cognitive pro-
cesses involved in constructing future events is well-spec-
ified (e.g., Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 
2007; Schacter, 2012, see Table 2). As these processes have 
been reviewed elsewhere (Schacter, 2012; Schacter et al., 
2017)—here we simply lay out the essential elements of 
the hypothesised processes involved in voluntary episodic 
future thinking.
First, we draw upon over a decade of empirical research 
that attempted to delineate the cognitive processes underly-
ing voluntary future thinking. We specify two main phases 
of this cognitive process, first outlined by Addis et  al. 
(2007). The first has been termed the construction phase 
and represents the ability to wilfully and consciously use 
the cue word task parameters to generate a future event 
by selecting the most appropriate details from memory 
(i.e., people, places, objects; see Addis, Musicaro, Pan & 
Schacter, 2010). Although generative memory retrieval is 
seen as constructive (and prone to error, Schacter, 2012), 
the process is aided by having a single temporal context to 
which details originally belong (see Anderson et al., 2012 
for similar arguments). In future event construction, the flex-
ible and complex nature of identifying and then selecting 
appropriate details from long-term memory to combine them 
into a novel ‘whole’ is presumably a key factor explaining 
why a link between executive processes and future thinking 
performance has been found in some studies, especially in 
the construction phase (Addis et al., 2007; Anderson et al., 
2012; D’Argembeau, Stawarczyk, Majerus, Collette, Van 
der Linden et al., 2010; de Vito et al., 2012). These cogni-
tive processes would naturally recruit a broad set of pro-
cesses collectively labelled executive function (see Miyake, 
Table 1  Two-dimensional structure of categorising future thoughts in 
terms of presence or absence of intention to have a future thought and 
levels of effort involved in imagining a future event
“?” indicates that there is little empirical or theoretical support for 
this type of future thought
Intention
Yes No
Effort
 Yes (low to medium to high) Generatively 
accessed future 
thought
?
 No or minimal effort Directly 
accessed future 
thought
Spontane-
ous future 
thought
2 It is interesting that even in studies that have used a continuous 
scale for rating intentionality of thoughts, for the purpose of analy-
ses, thoughts have been sometimes dichotomised by labelling all the 
thoughts rated at the lower end of the scale as ‘spontaneous’ and at 
higher end of the scale as ‘deliberate’ (Jordão, Pinho, & St. Jacques., 
2019).
3 This does not preclude the possibility that effort is required or nec-
essary after the spontaneous future thought arrives in consciousness, 
which is aligned with the difference between occurrence and mainte-
nance of mind wandering episodes (Smallwood, 2013).
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Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter et al., 2000; Stuss & 
Alexander, 2002).
The second phase has been termed the elaboration phase, 
and represents the vivid unfolding of the scene in one’s 
mind, after a scene is constructed (Addis et al., 2007). As 
such, areas associated with visual imagery become active 
here, as do those linked with self-referential processing 
(Addis et al., 2007; see also D’Argembeau et al., 2010a). 
However, elaboration is assumed to involve subjective ‘pre-
experiencing’, and not necessarily executive function (as 
shown by comparisons with the elaboration phase in future 
thinking and episodic remembering, Addis et al., 2007). 
Thus, we hypothesise that the processes of elaboration will 
be similar in voluntary and spontaneous future thought. We 
therefore see construction as the defining feature of vol-
untary future thinking, in agreement with several authors 
(Addis et al., 2007; D’Argembeau et al., 2010a; Schacter 
et al., 2012).
Episodic future construction can also be seen as the 
encoding of a new memory (of an imagined future event), 
and rather than encoding a lived experience, as would hap-
pen in autobiographical memory (Conway, 2005), an ‘event’ 
or scenario is encoded as a mental representation. Neuro-
scientific research has carefully disentangled the encoding 
components of episodic future thinking, using a subse-
quent memory paradigm to establish the neural correlates 
of successful ‘event’ encoding (Martin, Schacter, Corballis 
& Addis, 2011). This process, in our view especially asso-
ciated with voluntary future thinking, may hold important 
functions.4 In particular, the ability to “foresee, plan, and 
shape virtually any specific future event” (p. 299, Sudden-
dorf & Corballis, 2007) has been proposed as a key function 
of episodic future thinking, from those emphasising either 
evolutionary or everyday functions (Schacter, 2012; Schacter 
et al., 2017; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, 2010).
We hold that the ability to create novel scenarios in an 
iterative fashion, in which increasingly effective plans are 
created (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), garners wide-
ranging benefits, not only to personal, but also societal 
planning (Szpunar & Szpunar, 2016, see Jeunehomme & 
D’Argembeau, 2016 for a related point). Humans can cre-
ate hoped-for and feared possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 
1986), and devise plans in relation to these (Murru & Martin 
Ginis, 2010). In applied psychology, although ‘if–then’ plans 
within research on implementation intentions have proved 
Table 2  Differentiating 
processes, characteristics, 
paradigms and functions of 
voluntary and spontaneous 
future thinking
(b) Evidence for differences in characteristics is derived from Berntsen and Jacobsen (2008), Finnbogadót-
tir and Berntsen (2011), Cole et al. (2016)
(c) evidence for differences in methods is derived from Addis et al. (2008), Cole et al. (2016), Hassabis 
et al. (2007) (see also Schacter 2012, for a review)
(d) Indirect evidence for differences in functions comes from: Anderson (2012), who showed that voluntary 
future thinking can integrate different sources of information in a flexible way, and Spreng et  al. (2010) 
who demonstrated how this function could be harnessed when engaging in autobiographical planning. Evi-
dence for creating novel scenarios or plans voluntarily, is derived from over a decade of research using 
instructions emphasising novelty of the to-be-constructed events in the cue word paradigm (e.g., Addis 
et al. 2008). Results from this research contrast the findings on spontaneous future thinking by Cole et al. 
(2016) who found higher ratings of novelty for voluntary compared with spontaneous future thinking (for 
similar points, see Jeunehomme and D’Argembeau 2016). In terms of the functions of spontaneous future 
thought, we draw upon research showing a link between spontaneous future thought sand current concerns 
(e.g., Cole and Berntsen 2016) and prospective memory (e.g., Kvavilashvili and Fisher 2007; Szarras and 
Niedźwieńska 2011; for a review, see Kvavilashvili and Rummel 2019)
Voluntary future thinking Spontaneous future thinking
(a) Cognitive processes Intentional/deliberate Unintended/automatic
Slow, effortful Fast, effortless
Self-directed Undirected
(b) Characteristics of 
future thoughts
Semantic and episodic Largely episodic
Emotional and non-emotional in 
valence and emotional impact
Largely emotional in valence and impact
(c) Popular paradigms Cue-word method Vigilance task
(d) Possible functions Simulating novel events/scenarios Orienting to one’s existing current con-
cerns, upcoming tasks and goals
Creating and developing plans Aiding the completion of pending goals 
and prospective memory tasks
4 This does not exclude the possibility that spontaneous future 
thoughts are also re(encoded) when brought to mind, and this may be 
relevant to how spontaneous future thinking aids task completion in 
prospective memory tasks. We thank an anonymous reviewer for rais-
ing this point.
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effective (Gollwitzer, 1999), episodic future thinking has 
been shown to improve those plans (Knäuper, McCollam, 
Rosen-Brown, Lacaille, Kelso & Roseman, 2011), perhaps 
by stabilising the memory trace of the future simulation. 
Similar findings have been found in prospective memory, 
where the manipulation of episodic future simulation has 
been shown to ‘boost’ the encoding of prospective memo-
ries (e.g., Altgassen et al., 2015; Neroni, Gamboz & Brandi-
monte, 2014).
Of course, other ways in which voluntary future think-
ing could be harnessed must be acknowledged (see Szpunar, 
Spreng, & Schacter, 2014). To name a few, humans might 
use the ability to construct novel and coherent episodic 
future thoughts for encoding lists (Klein, Robertson & Del-
ton, 2010; Grilli & Glisky, 2011), intentional mental prac-
ticing of tasks (Driskell et al., 1994; Suddendorf, Brinums, 
& Imuta, 2016), increasing empathic behaviour (Gaesser & 
Schacter, 2014) or reducing impulsiveness (Daniel, Stanton 
& Einstein, 2013). In short, voluntary future thinking allows 
humans to creatively construct novel scenarios and envisage 
plans. These main functions are highlighted in Table 2.
Where we differ from previous approaches is by indicat-
ing that voluntary future thinking is not the dominant or 
the only type of future thinking in one’s cognitive arsenal. 
Specifically, in our view, with precise objectives (i.e., to cre-
ate an original plan), one can have flexibility and control 
over what one imagines, thus taking advantage of the vari-
ous benefits of the voluntary mode. Nevertheless, evidence 
abound that future thinking does not rely on a unitary pro-
cess (see Tables 1 and 2), and where construction processes 
are not involved (see below for examples of functions of 
spontaneous future thinking), some, or perhaps all, of these 
functions may not apply.
Spontaneous future thinking
Drawing upon recent work, spontaneous future thinking is 
characterised here as automatic, fast and undirected (see 
Table 2) (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Finnbogadottir & 
Berntsen, 2011; Cole et al., 2016; for a definition, see Bern-
tsen, 2019; Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019). As stated at the 
beginning of this article, the key question in future think-
ing research concerns the paradox of having fully-fledged 
episodic future thoughts in the absence of wilful construc-
tive processes. Fox and Christoff (2018) elaborated this idea 
by stating “the degree to which mental processes that are 
ostensibly spontaneous and beyond our control appear to be 
planned, relevant, and insightful with respect to our personal 
goals and concerns is striking” (p. 5). Within this quote they 
have also hinted at a solution and our central hypothesis con-
cerning spontaneous future thoughts. We propose that spon-
taneous future thoughts are best characterised as instances 
of ‘pre-made’ future thoughts or ‘memories of the future’ 
returning to consciousness after once being constructed in 
the past (see Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2016; Ingvar, 
1985; Szpunar, Addis, McLelland & Schacter, 2013). We 
believe that the pre-made hypothesis offers a solution to the 
paradox, as well as why spontaneous future thoughts are 
prevalent, occur with fluency and why they predominantly 
refer to temporally close and goal-related happenings.
We believe several hypotheses about spontaneous future 
thinking can be discarded from the outset. It is clear from 
several studies (e.g., Cole & Berntsen, 2016; Cole et al., 
2016; Mazzoni, 2019; Plimpton et al., 2015; Warden et al., 
2019) that they are not ‘fantasy-laden’ and ‘random’, or re-
interpretations of past memories as future-oriented thoughts 
(if the latter were true, experimenter and participant ratings 
into temporal categories of past, present, and future would 
be incongruent, but this is not the case, Plimpton et al., 
2015; Barzykowski et al., 2019; see Cole et al., 2016 for 
similar arguments).
Rather, spontaneous future thoughts are most often about 
concrete, upcoming events and/or planned tasks and goals, 
which have been previously constructed and/or deliberately 
thought of, and pop into mind in the delay interval before 
the event actually has taken place. Evidence for this can 
be found across a range of recent studies on spontaneous 
future thinking. The most important and direct evidence 
comes from those laboratory and naturalistic experience-
sampling studies that have specifically examined the content 
of participants’ spontaneous future thoughts (for a review 
of these studies, see Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2019). For 
example, using a laboratory vigilance task with probes in 
which participants had to describe their thoughts at that 
moment, Plimpton et  al. (2015) showed that plans and 
intended actions (e.g., “I remembered that I need to book 
some days out with friends and for myself”, “I must text 
X for a dinner date”) made up a large percentage (60%) of 
spontaneous future thoughts. A further 38% of spontaneous 
future thoughts referred to scheduled events in near future 
without specifying a particular intention (e.g., “thinking 
about my upcoming holiday to Cork”, “job interview I have 
next week”). Using a different version of the vigilance task, 
Mazzoni (2019) replicated and extended these findings by 
showing that spontaneous future thoughts were significantly 
more likely to be plans rather than imagined scenes of future 
events, and that thinking about planned actions involved 
less cognitive resources than thinking about future events 
(as these thoughts did not reduce in number during a more 
cognitively demanding vigilance task). It is important that 
the prevalence of thoughts about future plans has also been 
reported in several naturalistic diary and experience sam-
pling studies (e.g., Anderson & McDaniel., 2019, Study 1; 
Baumeister, 2018; D’Argembeau, Renaud & Van der Linden, 
2011; Warden et al., 2019).
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Importantly, these studies have also shown that not all 
spontaneous future thoughts were ‘pre-made’, because occa-
sionally participants reported experiencing novel spontane-
ous thoughts about the possible future plans or events that 
they had not constructed before. In other words, such minor-
ity cases point to an interesting possibility that sometimes 
novel constructions can come to mind automatically with-
out strategic effortful processes (see also Jeunehomme & 
D’Argembeau, 2016, for the discussion of this point in rela-
tion to directly accessed future thoughts within the cue word 
paradigm). Further evidence for such a possibility comes 
from recent studies by Szpunar et al., in which participants 
were asked to report spontaneous thoughts about the immi-
nent future (i.e., future scenarios that could happen in the 
next few seconds or minutes, in the context of the current 
situation, e.g., Puig & Szpunar, 2019). Puig and Szpunar’s 
preliminary evidence indicates that such mental representa-
tions have unexpected (i.e., novel) content, are largely nega-
tive and may serve behavioural functions (e.g., if imagin-
ing a car crash while driving, one might drive considerably 
slower). Such immediate spontaneous future thoughts may 
be a highly functional evolutionary precursor to the volun-
tary future thoughts that enable humans to achieve goals in 
future contexts (see Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007 for more 
elaborated and related evolutionary arguments).
Further evidence for the ‘pre-made’ hypothesis of spon-
taneous future thoughts and why they come to mind rapidly 
(Cole et al., 2016), comes from studies that have compared 
the temporal distribution of thoughts. Thus, compared to 
voluntary future thoughts, spontaneous future thoughts are 
often about temporally near events referring to tasks and 
events occurring later in the same day or in the next few days 
(for a review, see Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2019; see also 
Berntsen, 2019, for a re-analysis of data from three stud-
ies). Presumably, concrete and previously constructed plans 
would likely refer to temporally near happenings, and this 
accords with data from several studies (Berntsen & Jacob-
sen, 2008; Cole et al., 2016; Plimpton et al., 2015).
Yet another way of assessing the ‘pre-made’ hypothe-
sis is to ask participants to introspect about the frequency 
and the source of their spontaneous future thought content. 
For example, using the vigilance task and the standard 
cue word paradigm to assess spontaneous and deliberate 
thoughts about the future and the past, respectively, Cole 
et al. (2016) found that ratings of rehearsal (How often have 
you previously thought about the imagined future event?) 
made on a 5-point scale (1, never; 5, very often) were the 
highest for spontaneous future thoughts when compared to 
all other types of thought, which did not differ from each 
other. In another (unpublished) study, using the same vigi-
lance task, participants were asked the extent to which their 
future thoughts contained ‘exactly the same’ configuration 
of details as a previously constructed future thought (Cole, 
Barnes, Jones, & Elwell, 2018). Of all spontaneous future 
thoughts, the most frequently provided response indicated 
that participants experienced almost ‘exactly the same’ (4 
on a scale of 1–5, 5 being ‘exactly the same’) content as 
a previously-constructed future event. Voluntary future 
thoughts, on the other hand, were significantly less likely to 
be reiterations of previously constructed thoughts, and nei-
ther spontaneous nor voluntary future thoughts were defined 
by participants simply as memories recast or reinterpreted 
as future-oriented (such as a dentist appointment from the 
past re-interpreted as a representation of the future). In other 
words, voluntary future thoughts were not simply replays of 
the past, and fulfilled the typical definition of a constructed 
novel event, and spontaneous future thoughts were largely 
based on the content of previous future event constructions.
Broadly similar findings were obtained also by Jeune-
homme and D’Argembeau (2016) on directly accessed future 
thoughts elicited in the context of the cue word paradigm 
to study voluntary future thinking (but instructing partici-
pants to think of plausible future events without emphasis-
ing the need to produce novel events). Across three experi-
ments, their results showed that the vast majority of directly 
accessed thoughts, which came to mind ‘fully-formed’ as 
specific episodic scenarios, had been thought of previously 
(i.e., they were not novel) and the frequency of previous 
construction (rated on a scale by participants) predicted the 
likelihood of a direct versus generative process. In addition, 
the likelihood of direct response was significantly increased 
by perceived probability that the imagined event was going 
to actually happen in the future (Exp. 1). Based on these 
findings, Jeunehomme and D’Argembeau (2016) concluded 
that most directly accessed episodic future thoughts could 
be conceptualised as ‘memories of the future’ rather than 
newly constructed or imagined future events, and high-
lighted the potential importance of such pre-stored mental 
representations of the future in successfully managing goal-
directed and planned behaviours in everyday life (see also 
Baumeister, Maranges, & Sjåstad, 2018; Baumeister, Oet-
tingen & Vohs, 2016).
If one accepts the premise that spontaneous future 
thoughts are primarily pre-made constructions, and ‘mem-
ories of the future’, it would necessarily follow that they 
would come to mind with little effort and no intent (the 
defining features of spontaneous future thoughts, Cole & 
Kvavilashvili, 2019, see Tables 1 and 2). It also becomes 
clear how they can be re-instated in consciousness with such 
rapidity when semantically-related external cues appear in 
the environment (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Cole et al., 
2016; Plimpton et al., 2015), or even when deliberate con-
struction is attempted (Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2016). 
Commonalities between involuntary memories and sponta-
neous future thoughts (e.g., in specificity, vividness, latency; 
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Cole et al., 2016) also become explicable, when one assumes 
both rely on the reactivation of a memory.
Furthermore, if we assume that spontaneous future 
thoughts are often pre-made, and can be cued not only by 
external stimuli, but also by internal thoughts (see Warden 
et al., 2019), it is understandable why mind wandering stud-
ies that do not use meaningful external stimuli find high 
rates of future thoughts (Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 
2009). It also explains why prospective memory, mental 
time travel and mind wandering studies, in which partici-
pants record their everyday thoughts, find that future-ori-
ented spontaneous thoughts are highly prevalent, as they are 
not only ‘memories of the future’, but are also goal-relevant 
and sensitised to the many potential cues experienced in 
daily life (D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 
2007; Warden et al., 2019). In other words, they represent 
previously formulated goals and intentions to be completed 
at some point in the future (for more detailed discussion, see 
Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2019).
We believe that this hypothesised cognitive process holds 
many functional benefits. First, within our account, spon-
taneous future thoughts would fulfil the criteria of a goal 
‘reminder mechanism’ (Klinger, 2013). Second, it would 
serve to remind people of prospective memory tasks they 
need to carry out in the future (Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007; 
Szarras & Niedźwieńska, 2011; see Mazzoni, 2019, for 
related arguments). Third, it may strengthen the intention-
superiority effect in prospective memory, which refers to 
intention related contents having heightened levels of acti-
vation compared to other contents stored in memory (Gos-
chke & Kuhl, 1993). If individuals may ‘pre-experience’ 
intended acts spontaneously in the delay, this would further 
strengthen the representations of those acts in one’s memory. 
Finally, it may fit into the prescient model of mental time 
travel and decision-taking put forward by Boyer (2008), 
in which involuntary or spontaneous remindings served to 
reduce impulsive behaviour.
In short, spontaneous future thinking may garner far more 
benefits than we currently acknowledge. Take this example. 
An office worker constructs a mental image of handing their 
colleague a birthday card when they arrive at work. How-
ever, typically there would be no explicit reminders to help 
the worker to deliver the letter when at work—the time when 
a goal-oriented response is needed. Hence, a self-reliant sys-
tem that regularly re-activates pre-made plans, and is sensi-
tised to be triggered internally or by external cues, is ideally 
suited to re-orient the individual to their goal and ensure 
the card is handed over. In short, such a process is highly 
adaptive and it is no surprise that it is prevalent in daily life 
(e.g., Ellis & Nimmo-Smith, 1993; Sellen, Louie, Harris & 
Wilkins, 1997; Szarras & Niedźwieńska, 2011).
The links between spontaneous future thinking and goal-
oriented cognition notwithstanding, we note here that we 
do not perceive the functions identified in Table 2 as the 
only ones related to spontaneous future thinking. Indeed, 
it is plausible that spontaneous future thinking fulfils other 
functions, some of which have been indicated in the mind 
wandering literature (e.g., emotion regulation, see Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen & Singer, 2013; see also Smallwood 
& Schooler, 2015). We call on other researchers to explore 
different functions, and specifically compare functions of 
voluntary and spontaneous future thought in single studies. 
We note the current dearth of such research (although see 
Duffy & Cole, 2019). But in this position paper, our focus 
remains on the relevance of spontaneous future thinking to 
goal-oriented cognition and behaviour, which coheres with 
several well-established theoretical accounts (e.g., Klinger, 
2013, see below).
Relation to other theoretical approaches
Theoretical progress has already been made by Berntsen 
et al. , who proposed that spontaneous future thinking (and 
involuntary memory) is an evolutionarily earlier function 
than voluntary (past and) future thinking (Berntsen, 2012; 
Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008). They also proposed that the 
former had unique benefits by providing an ongoing and 
effort-free way that “helps us to maintain a wider time hori-
zon with low cognitive costs” (p. 304, Berntsen, 2012).
A potential cognitive mechanism of spontaneous future 
thinking was also proposed by Berntsen and colleagues by 
suggesting that the occurrence of involuntary thoughts about 
the future, much like involuntary autobiographical memo-
ries “would owe their existence to spreading activation in 
complex associative networks for autobiographical informa-
tion” (p. 1102, Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008). In a more recent 
paper, Berntsen (2019) discusses similarities between the 
temporal distribution curves for past and future events and 
questions whether this could reflect the exact same mecha-
nisms underlying spontaneous mental time travel about the 
past and the future. However, according to Berntsen (2019) 
such an “explanation would force us to radically rethink 
theories of forgetting because frequently invoked forget-
ting mechanisms (e.g., interference and decay) operate on 
already encoded and stored information. Such explanations 
would not work for imagined future events since future 
events have not yet been encountered and encoded” (p. 
656). We take a different stance from Berntsen (2019) on 
the underlying mechanisms of spontaneous future thoughts. 
Under the pre-made hypothesis, such forgetting processes 
would clearly operate on spontaneous future thoughts, as 
they rely on well-known memory processes, following their 
known and well-defined temporal trajectory (see Szpunar 
et al., 2013, for a review of the ‘memories of the future’ 
hypothesis concerning voluntary future thinking). This dual-
process account therefore solves the question of similarities 
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between the temporal distribution of spontaneous past and 
future thoughts.
Our explanation of the process that underlies spontane-
ous future thoughts is most consistent with Klinger’s current 
concern theory (Klinger, 1975, 2009). The theory of cur-
rent concerns indicates that, at any one time, humans have 
a highly active set of goals that they are committed to but 
have not yet been completed or discarded. These goals are 
sensitive to cues emanating from the external environment 
or internal train of thought, wholly or partially related to 
that goal. Findings from spontaneous future thoughts not 
only indicate that they are highly goal-related (e.g., Cole 
& Berntsen, 2016), but also that they are activated by cues, 
especially in the external environment (Cole et al., 2016; 
Plimpton et al., 2015; Warden et al., 2019).
This dual process account of episodic future think-
ing also fits nicely with the recently proposed extension 
of the autobiographical Self Memory System by Conway 
et al. (2019), which incorporates into the autobiographical 
memory system voluntary episodic future thinking on the 
one hand (described above), and what has been termed the 
remembering-imagining system (RIS; Conway, Loveday and 
Cole, 2016), on the other.
The RIS operates within the present time-frame of this 
extended autobiographical self-memory model. According 
to Conway et al. (2016), “there is what we conceive of as an 
extended form of consciousness that consists of memories 
of the recent past and images and expectations of the near 
future, and it is this form of extended consciousness that 
we have termed the RIS.” (p. 257). This increased aware-
ness of temporally-near past and future episodes specifies 
an extended present time-frame—an extended ‘now’. Data 
presented by Conway et al. (2016), together with findings 
from Spreng and Levine (2006) and Berntsen’s laboratory 
(see Berntsen, 2019) support this hypothesis, at least for past 
and future thinking which involve constructive processes.
How does this fit within the proposed dual process 
account of future thinking? In Conway et al. (2016), the 
RIS was integrated into the Self Memory System (see Con-
way & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2019). In so 
doing, past and future thinking was seen in the context of a 
goal-oriented cognitive system whereby abstract goals (e.g., 
becoming healthy), are fed into lifetime periods (e.g., train-
ing for a 10 km race) leading to the construction of tempo-
rally-near episodic future thoughts (e.g., running 5 km in the 
park tomorrow, see Conway et al., 2019). The link between 
goals and constructed episodic future thoughts is well-evi-
denced (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; D’Argembeau et al., 
2011; Spreng & Levine, 2013). Critically, when carried out, 
what were episodic future thoughts become a set of highly 
accessible temporally-near goal-related episodic memories 
(Conway et al., 2019). Thus, a goal-oriented cognitive sys-
tem is delineated.
In our view, spontaneous past and future thoughts natu-
rally emanate from the RIS and this extended autobiograph-
ical memory system. Specifically, if constructed episodic 
future thoughts often represent to-be-completed tasks that 
are themselves related to abstract goals, it is unsurprising 
that future thoughts recorded in mind wandering, prospec-
tive memory and involuntary future thinking studies are 
mostly related to temporally-near planned tasks and upcom-
ing events (e.g., Plimpton et al., 2015; Warden et al., 2019, 
see above sections for more empirical support). Function-
ally, these ‘pre-made’ representations of upcoming future 
events and planned actions, which reside at the bottom layer 
of the hierarchy in the form of ‘episodic details’ or memo-
ries, would then be sensitised to external and internal cues, 
aiding their behavioural completion (see Klinger, 1975; 
Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2019; see also Jeunehomme & 
D’Argembeau, 2016 for a similar proposal regarding directly 
accessed future thoughts).
Developing these ideas further, under the updated self 
memory system (Conway et  al., 2019), episodic future 
thoughts are constructed via activation through levels of 
autobiographical knowledge (see Fig. 1). While we agree 
that voluntary future thinking may operate in this way, the 
dual process approach outlined here differs by assuming dif-
ferent cognitive processes for spontaneous future thinking. 
Specifically, Conway et al. (2019) propose that event-specific 
details (e.g., people, places objects) from the bottom layer 
of autobiographical knowledge are utilised and integrated 
into episodic future thoughts, incorporating details which are 
essentially ‘atemporal’ (until they are linked with coherent 
autobiographical memories or future thoughts). However, 
in our framework, upcoming events and plans have already 
undergone detail integration, and thus exist as an integrated 
‘whole’ (consisting of a set of bound episodic details), 
that can be accessed and brought to mind spontaneously.5 
Although such pre-made representations are not included in 
Conway and colleagues’ model, considering they are highly 
specific, placed within this model, they would logically form 
a subset of representations in the lowest level of autobio-
graphical knowledge (but would be combined with personal 
5 Note that a pre-made future thought would cease to be ‘atemporal’ 
like other event-specific details on the lowest level of autobiographi-
cal knowledge, and would be instead treated as ‘future-oriented’ as 
it pertains to an upcoming event or future plan (i.e., it would have a 
temporal ‘tag’). Although event representations may be similar in 
content whether past- or future- oriented, we highlight that humans 
are able to recognise the temporal directions of internal representa-
tions, at least in healthy populations. Thus, past and future representa-
tions are typically not confused, perhaps due to their contrasting phe-
nomenological characteristics (see D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2004; Johnson & Sherman, 1990 for relevant discussions).
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semantic information—i.e., contextualised within lifetime 
periods and self-images—when brought to consciousness).6
Although the RIS and Conway’s updated autobiographi-
cal memory system is still primarily focussed on explaining 
voluntary and constructive processes in past and future men-
tal time travel, we believe that they represent useful theoreti-
cal frameworks to understand the existence and processes 
underlying spontaneous future thought, leading to testable 
research questions for researchers working on future think-
ing or related areas.
Future directions
The approach to future thinking, described in this article, 
leads to several open-ended questions and avenues for 
future investigations. Here, we specify what we see as the 
main questions in the field. It is clear from emerging stud-
ies focussing on spontaneous future thinking, that a natural 
and helpful strategy has been to compare this phenomenon 
with related areas such as involuntary memory and volun-
tary future thinking. How, then, can we test the dual process 
account using such comparisons?
Findings based on introspection may be particularly 
informative. As described in the study above (Cole et al., 
2018), researchers can ask participants whether a particular 
spontaneous future thought has been constructed before. If 
the pre-made hypothesis is correct, one would expect partici-
pants to rate the event high on a scale of previous construc-
tion (see Cole et al., 2016; Jeneuhomme & D’Argembeau, 
2016, for initial evidence). In the case of voluntary future 
thoughts, a wealth of research has demonstrated that these 
can, and often are, novel at the time of construction, thus 
participants should identify these as novel (Addis et al., 
2007, 2010; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). Indeed, 
the novelty imbued by constructive processes may be a 
function unique to voluntary future thinking (see Table 2). 
Overall then, differences should be found in the extent to 
which spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts are previ-
ously constructed. Of course, these findings are only valid 
to the extent that an individual can accurately recall whether 
a spontaneous future thought has been constructed, and 
research will be needed to clarify how such introspective 
judgments are made.
Contrasting spontaneous future thoughts with involun-
tary autobiographical memories on measures of introspec-
tion may be another interesting avenue for investigation. 
Specifically, participants may indicate that spontaneous 
future thoughts had been previously thought about more fre-
quently than spontaneous thoughts about the past (cf. covert 
rehearsal, Johnson, Foley, Suengas, Raye, 1998). Another 
question is whether ‘rehearsal’ is positively correlated with 
the frequency of occurrence of such spontaneous thoughts 
(cf. Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2016, for a similar find-
ing in the context of direct access). In addition to introspec-
tion, as both are encoded, researchers may find it useful to 
examine forgetting curves of the original experience (in the 
case of involuntary autobiographical memories) or imagined 
‘event’ (in spontaneous future thought). Future research will 
be needed though to distinguish the contribution of basic 
forgetting processes versus a possible general preference to 
report more upcoming future thoughts.7 Researchers may 
also adopt experimental methods (e.g., Mazzoni, 2019; Van-
nucci et al., 2019) to examine how voluntary constructions 
affect subsequent past and future spontaneous thoughts.
Another interesting question links back to the RIS (Con-
way et al., 2016) and the intention superiority effect in pro-
spective memory research and whether the representations 
of upcoming future plans and events accrue higher levels 
of activation than representations of past events. Some ini-
tial evidence for this idea comes from the results of mind-
wandering studies with the Sustained Attention to Response 
Task where a prospective bias is predominantly found when 
participants are not exposed to meaningful irrelevant or inci-
dental cues (e.g., Baird et al., 2011, see also Warden et al., 
2019; when verbal cues are present people tend to think 
more about the past, as shown by Vannucci et al., 2017). 
The central question is that if a future thought arrives in con-
sciousness without any noticeable external or internal cue, 
this thought should be more highly activated than the rep-
resentation of the thought that is triggered by a cue. Future 
research is needed to tackle this issue further.
Other empirical questions arise from exploring differ-
ences between different subtypes of spontaneous future 
thought, such as specific intentions or plans to do something 
(e.g., buying a present for a friend’s birthday) and upcoming 
events that do not specify any intended actions in relation 
to them (e.g., a job interview next week) (as reported by 
Plimpton et al., 2015 and Warden et al., 2019). Although 
upcoming intentions and events may be previously con-
structed and related to higher-order goals such as ‘being a 
good friend’ and ‘finding a satisfying job’, respectively (see 
Cole & Berntsen, 2016), spontaneous future thoughts rep-
resenting plans and prospective memory tasks may serve 
to initiate goal-oriented thoughts and behaviour (Klinger, 
1975; Klinger, Marchetti, & Koster, 2018), while spontane-
ous thoughts about upcoming events may serve the func-
tion of rehearsing the contents or components of upcoming 
events (e.g., types of questions that may come up during 
the interview). For example, when Stawarczyk, Majerus 
and D’Argembeau (2013) falsely informed their participants 
6 We thank a reviewer for bringing this possibility to our attention. 7 We thank a reviewer for raising this point.
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that they would perform either a stressful task (a videotaped 
speech about one’s physical appearance) or a neutral task (a 
simple visual planning task) following the sustained atten-
tion to response task with thought-probes, they found that 
more than 25% of reported mind-wandering episodes in the 
experimental group were described as attempts to prepare 
for the subsequent task versus only 2% in the control group 
(see also Steindorf & Rummel, 2017). More specific inves-
tigations into differences between the functions served by 
spontaneous future thoughts about upcoming plans/inten-
tions and events will be necessary to address this question. A 
related line of research should investigate in more detail the 
frequency and nature of those spontaneous future thoughts 
about hypothetical events and scenarios, which appeared to 
be novel constructions (i.e., did not seem to be “pre-made”) 
as reported in several studies (Plimpton et al., 2015; Puig & 
Szpunar, 2019; Warden et al., 2019), to examine an interest-
ing theoretical question whether completely novel events can 
come to mind without intention and effortful deliberation 
and construction processes.
Finally, although understanding of voluntary and invol-
untary or spontaneous future thought has increased in recent 
years, the dynamic interplay between these modes of future 
thinking is poorly understood. In short, what is the inter-
play between spontaneous and voluntary future thinking in 
cognitive tasks and daily life? Even if most future thoughts 
are triggered spontaneously, are controlled cognitive pro-
cesses required to ‘verify’ or ‘monitor’ these thoughts at 
later stages of processing? Some research has begun to 
tackle this question in the context of mind wandering (e.g., 
Pelagatti, Binder & Vannucci, 2018; Christoff et al., 2016; 
see Smallwood, 2013 for a review), showing that specific 
examination of the temporal dynamics of future thought is 
certainly a tractable avenue of research.
Summary
One need only look at other areas of cognitive psychology 
to find useful dual-process frameworks, which have added 
substantial explanatory value (see Evans, 2008 for a review; 
Kahneman, 2011; McDaniel, Umanath, Einstein, & Wal-
dum, 2015; Yonelinas, 1999). In our view, future thinking 
can be characterised by two processes that complement each 
other: Voluntary future thinking is required to construct or 
encode new ‘events’, and spontaneous future thinking is 
able to retrieve these future thoughts in an automatic fash-
ion. The role of future thinking in goal-oriented cognition 
and behaviour has been clearly stated in many dominant 
theoretical accounts of future thinking and the self (Con-
way et al., 2019; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Schacter & 
Addis, 2007). However, in addition to standard approaches, 
this dual process account explains how future thinking can 
aid future-oriented cognition and behaviour in a relatively 
effortless manner (and supports findings from prospective 
memory, mind wandering and mental time travel research). 
Specifically, a system is delineated whereby humans are 
periodically and vividly reminded of their currently active 
goals, making goal completion more probable (cf. Kvavilas-
hvili & Rummel, 2019). However, we highlight the fact that 
more empirical work is needed to lend further support to 
this approach and evaluate alternative explanations (e.g., 
Berntsen, 2019).
Fundamentally, if future thinking were functionally 
important, it would not be efficient to use effortful future 
thinking when memory processes allow us to re-instate 
thoughts spontaneously. So, even though we have known 
of the existence of spontaneous future thinking for a decade 
(Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008), the field may have neglected 
a tantalising possibility: That spontaneous future thinking is 
the default mode of imagining the future.
Acknowledgements The authors would like to recognise the contribu-
tors to the special issue on Spontaneous Future Cognition, published 
in Psychological Research (2019). Our reading and discussions about 
the interesting papers of this special issue provided the impetus for us 
to write this paper.
Compliance with ethical standards 
Conflict of interest Author SC declares that he has no conflict of inter-
est. Author LK declares that she has no conflict of interest.
Ethical approval This article does not contain any studies with human 
participants performed by any of the authors.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta-
tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes 
were made. The images or other third party material in this article are 
included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated 
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in 
the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not 
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will 
need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a 
copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/.
References
Addis, D. R., Musicaro, R., Pan, L., & Schacter, D. L. (2010). Episodic 
simulation of past and future events in older adults: Evidence 
from an experimental recombination task. Psychology and Aging, 
25, 369–376. https ://doi.org/10.1037/a0017 280.
Addis, D. R., Wong, A., & Schacter, D. L. (2007). Remembering the 
past and imagining the future: Common and distinct neural sub-
strates during event construction and elaboration. Neuropsycho-
logia, 45, 1363–1377. https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuro psych ologi 
a.2006.10.016.
Psychological Research 
1 3
Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). Age-related 
changes in the episodic simulation of future events. Psy-
chological Science, 19, 33–41. https ://doi.org/10.111
1/j.1467-9280.2008.02043 .x.
Altgassen, M., Rendell, P. G., Bernhard, A., Henry, J. D., Bailey, P. E., 
Phillips, L. H., & Kliegel, M. (2015). Future thinking improves 
prospective memory performance and plan enactment in older 
adults. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 68, 192–
204. https ://doi.org/10.1080/17470 218.2014.95612 7.
Anderson, R. A. (2012). Imagining novel futures: The roles of event 
plausibility and familiarity. Memory, 20(5), 443–451. https ://doi.
org/10.1080/09658 211.2012.67745 0.
Anderson, R. J., & Dewhurst, S. A. (2009). Remembering the past and 
imagining the future: Differences in event specificity of sponta-
neously generated thought. Memory, 17, 367–373. https ://doi.
org/10.1080/09658 21090 27516 69.
Anderson, R. J., Dewhurst, S. A., & Nash, R. (2012). Shared processes 
underlying past and future thinking: The impact of imagery 
and concurrent Task demands on event specificity. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 38, 356–365. https ://doi.
org/10.1037/a0025 451.
Anderson, F. T., & McDaniel, M. A. (2019). Hey buddy, why don’t 
we take it outside: An experience sampling study of prospec-
tive memory. Memory & Cognition, 47, 47–62. https ://doi.
org/10.3758/s1342 1-018-0849-x.
Andrews-Hanna, J. R., Kaiser, R. H., Turner, A. E., Reineberg, A. 
E., Godinez, D., Dimidjian, S., & Banich, M. T. (2013). A 
penny for your thoughts: dimensions of self-generated thought 
content and relationships with individual differences in emo-
tional wellbeing. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 900. https ://doi.
org/10.3389/fpsyg .2013.00900 .
Atance, C. M., & O’Neill, D. K. (2001). Episodic future thinking. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5, 533–539.
Baird, B., Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2011). Back to the 
future: Autobiographical planning and the functionality of 
mind-wandering. Consciousness & Cognition, 20, 1604–1611. 
https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.conco g.2011.08.007.
Barzykowski, K., Radel, R., Niedźwieńska, A., & Kvavilashvili, L. 
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